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REBUILDING CORPORATE BOARDS AND
REFOCUSING SHAREHOLDERS FOR THE
POST-ENRON ERA
KEITH L. JOHNSONt
INTRODUCTION
We are at a critical point in the history of capitalism. A
series of unexpected corporate disasters has rocked the markets
and damaged the stature of the American business model.
Workers have seen their retirement savings dwindle or even
disappear. The media has made headlines out of our anger
about the losses caused by corporate wrongdoers who made
personal fortunes while misleading investors. Fear has driven
shareholders out of the stock market in droves.'
Congress reacted to these developments by passing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act"), which contains
accounting and corporate governance reforms that no one would
have predicted could be enacted just a few months earlier.2 The
t Mr. Johnson is Chief Legal Counsel of the State of Wisconsin Investment
Board, the tenth largest public pension fund in the U.S. The views expressed in this
Article are solely those of the author and do not represent the position of the
author's client.
I For a general discussion of the impact that recent corporate scandals have
had on investors and on the U.S. business model, see John A. Byrne et al., How to
Fix Corporate Governance, BUS. WK., May 6, 2002, at 69; Kurt Eichenwald, Even if
Heads Roll, Mistrust Will Live on, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 3, at 1; Louis Lavelle,
The Best & Worst Boards: How the Corporate Scandals Are Sparking a Revolution
in Governance, BUS. WK., Oct. 7, 2002, at 104.
2 The Act was signed into law by President Bush on July 30, 2002. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Among reforms included in
the Act were creation of a new independent Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, § 101(a) (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7211); restriction of non-
audit services that accountants can provide to audit clients, § 201 (to be codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1), a requirement that audit committees consist only of
independent directors, § 206 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1);
creation of CEO and CFO financial statement certifications, § 302 (to be codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7241); mandatory off-balance-sheet transaction reporting,
§ 401 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7261); and increased penalties for
corporate fraud, §§ 901-904 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has proposed new listing
standards calling for a majority of totally independent directors
on boards, shareholder approval of employee stock option plans,
and other reforms institutional investors have unsuccessfully
sought for years. 3
Has the call for reform run its course? Is there more to be
learned from lessons of the past year? The most potent force
created by the serial effects of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco,
Global Crossings, Waste Management, Cendant, and other
recent corporate tragedies may have been the awakening of the
institutional investor community. Regardless of whether
additional regulatory or legislative reforms are enacted,
shareholders have seen how ineffective boards, conflicts of
interest, and perverted compensation systems can destroy
value. 4 They have also tasted the fruits of success through
enactment of accounting reforms in the Act. 5
We may be witnessing a once-in-a-lifetime cultural value
change. According to McKinsey and Company, seventy-six
percent of institutional investors in North America now say they
would be willing to pay a premium for a well-governed company.6
Additionally, fifty-seven percent of those investors say that
corporate governance is as, or more, important than financial
issues in their evaluation of companies.7 Not long ago, attitudes
toward corporate governance were not even considered
important enough to survey.
Whether this new sensitivity toward corporate governance
results in better run companies may depend in large part on how
U.S.C.).
3 See Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from
the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Comm. as Approved by
the NYSE Board of Directors (Aug. 16, 2002), at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-
gov..pro.b.pdf (Aug. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Corporate Governance Rule Proposals].
4 The Brookings Institute estimated that the combined cost of the Enron and
WorldCom frauds to the nation's GDP could be as high at $57 billion in the first
year and will likely be much greater because that estimate was based on the
assumption that the stock market would not drop below its July 22, 2002 level. See
Carol Graham et al., Cooking the Books: The Cost to the Economy, BROOKINGS INST.,
POLICY BRIEF No.106 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu. Plaintiffs'
lawsuits claim hundreds of billions of dollars in damages to investors also have been
caused by Enron and other recent corporate meltdowns. Id.
5 See generally Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
6 McKinsey & Company, Global Investor Opinion Survey: Key Findings (July
2002), available at www.mckinsey.com/governance.
7 Id.
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current shareholder enthusiasm is channeled. If shareholders
focus on the primary factors that are shown to improve corporate
performance, then shareholders should be able to gain a more
influential role to the benefit of all market participants. If,
however, shareholders flail about in different directions without
developing some common understanding of what is important
and effective, a healthier governance system with an equilibrium
of corporate governance checks and balances may remain out of
reach.
One thing should be clear by now-the corporate governance
model that produced Enron and its progeny has been in need of
improvement. This Article suggests three basic principles for
consideration by shareholders to guide them in an effort to
grapple with the issues raised by recent corporate scandals and
to work toward a more effective system of corporate governance.
These principles are: (a) committing more resources and effort to
corporate governance research; (b) improving director education;
and (c) replacing ineffective directors.
I. DIAGNOSING INEFFECTIVE BOARDS:
IGNORANT, UNCERTAIN, OR INEFFECTIVE?
Over the last decade, a number of recommended best
practice codes for corporate boards have been developed. The
Business Roundtable, the California Public Employees
Retirement System (CalPERS), TIAA-CREF, the National
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), and the Council of
Institutional Investors (CII) have all adopted principles or
recommendations for model corporate governance structures and
practices.8 Although these best practice codes vary in many
regards, they coalesced around several primary concepts,
including the following:
A substantial majority of board members should be
independent from management;
8 NAT'L ASSN OF CORPORATE DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLuE RIBBON
COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM (2001 ed.); California Public
Employees' Retirement System, Corporate Governance Core Principals & Guidelines
(Apr. 13, 1998); Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Policies, at
http://www.cii.org/corp-governance.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2002); The Business
Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance (May 2002), at
htt://www.brtable.org/pdf/704.pdf; TIAA-CREF Electronic Library, Corporate
Governance: TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on Corporate Governance, at
http://www.tiaa-cref.org/libra/governance (last visited Oct. 19, 2002).
20021
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Directors should bring a diversity of relevant skill sets to the
board;
Only independent directors should be appointed to audit
compensation and nominating or corporate governance
committees;
Independent directors should regularly meet outside the
presence of management and inside directors;
Boards should evaluate their own performance as well as that
of the CEO;
Compensation plans should align the financial interests of
directors and management with shareholders;
Planning for management succession is a central responsibility
of the board;
Directors should be trained in carrying out their
responsibilities; and
Boards should regularly communicate effectively and candidly
with shareholders.
These basic principles make sense on an intuitive level and
have recently been working their way into regulatory and
exchange listing requirements. 9  Many companies, however,
ignore these principles. For example, the NACD reports that
boards of 39% of companies still lack a majority of unaffiliated
independent directors, 30% have non-independent directors on
their audit committees, 39% do not have a fully-independent
compensation committee, and 60% do not have a nominating
committee. 10 The NACD also reports that two-thirds of directors
say they are not satisfied with how effectively board succession
planning responsibilities have been performed."
9 See, e.g., §§ 201-209 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (requiring that all audit committee members be independent). Listing
standards proposed by the NYSE would require a majority of board members to be
independent; limit members of the audit, compensation and nominating or corporate
governance committees to independent directors; encourage training for directors;
promote management succession planning; and require the independent directors to
regularly meet in executive session without management. See Corporate
Governance Rule Proposals, supra note 3
10 NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., 2001-2002 PUBLIC COMPANY
GOVERNANCE SURVEY (2001).
11 Id. This level of dissatisfaction is surprising given that the NACD survey
respondents rated CEO succession as their second most important responsibility,
behind only corporate performance.
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What is wrong with this picture? While a general consensus
has developed on a number of basic corporate governance
principles, a substantial number of boards have failed to adopt
these best practices. There are three ways to explain why this
has happened: (1) adoption of best practices is not seen by
directors as having any clear positive net impact; (2) directors
are not aware of the best practices recommendations; or (3) for
some reason, directors have taken no action to adopt what they
perceive to have value.
The first possible reason for inaction could be resolved
through further research to identify and isolate the impacts of
best practices and through better communication of research
findings. The last two obstacles could be resolved by better
educating directors and by replacing the ineffective ones with
new candidates who are aware of issues relating to director
duties and who are willing to act in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. 12
Therein lie the challenges facing shareholders today as they
seek to address corporate governance shortcomings. To
maximize their positive impact, shareholders could remove these
roadblocks by: (1) encouraging further interdisciplinary research
to identify the factors that drive company success; (2) fostering
the growth of meaningful director education programs and
requiring that board members attend them; and (3) replacing
directors who are incompetent, untrustworthy, or ill-suited to
their roles.
A focus on corporate governance research, education, and
election of new directors is substantially at odds with what most
institutional investors have been doing over the last decade. 13
Advisory shareholder resolutions, which have been the mainstay
of institutional investor shareholder activism, are almost always
ignored by companies. That is not to say that positive changes
cannot be obtained through pursuit of advisory resolutions. It is
likely, however, that a greater impact on corporate performance
12 Directors are charged with a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Loft,
Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1938), affd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
13 Company responses to resolutions adopted by shareholders are tracked by
the Council of Institutional Investors. Though dozens of resolutions pass each proxy
season, only a few companies implement the resolutions. See Council of Institutional
Investors, Majority Vote Companies, at http://www.cii.org/majvotesum.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2002).
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could be obtained by focusing shareholder activities, on factors
found to be directly associated with enhancing or maintaining
corporate value. It makes little sense to devote great energy and
resources to precatory shareholder resolutions when they are
routinely ignored.
II. SHAREHOLDER ACTION: THE KEY TO RESTORING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Commissioning Research
To remain relevant in a post-Enron world, institutional
investors need to re-evaluate the terms of engagement with their
companies and identify those primary actions that would best
serve their interests. Commissioning research on corporate
governance and keeping abreast of the findings are the keys to
success. It is time to replace what some view as the shareholder
activism folklore of the twentieth century with a scientific
approach. Knowledge is power, and it could be the engine that
guides shareholder activism to meet the challenges of the
twenty-first century.
That is not to say that shareholders have not already
embarked on the scientific search to better understand which
governance factors drive corporate success. There are a number
of consultants, institutes, and academic institutions that engage
in research on corporate governance from the shareholders'
perspective. 14  But shareholders, particularly sophisticated
shareholder groups, could benefit from taking a more active role
in financing, directing, and using the knowledge base developed
by that research. 15
14 For example, the Investor Responsibility Research Center, TIAA-CREF
Institute, University of Delaware Corporate Governance Center, Institutional
Shareholder Services, and other organizations engage in relevant corporate
governance research.
15 One topic where shareholder-sponsored research could have helped in the
past was with the use of employee stock options. Institutional investors accepted
wholesale the argument that employee stock options would align the interests of
management with shareholders. It has since become obvious that the most
commonly used employee option plans actually provided management with
incentive to artificially inflate stock prices over the short term so that options could
be exercised at great profits. More recent research suggests that "[tihe relationship
between executives' stock holdings and their companies' performance is so close to
zero that it is zero in statistical terms." David Leonhardt, Options Do Not Raise
Performance, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at 4. The only company
[Vol.76:787
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While shareholders have spent much time on how to identify
an "independent director," the psychological, behavioral, and
intellectual factors associated with being an effective
independent director have received little shareholder attention.
What personality, relationship, educational, financial,
experiential, and other criteria should be used to identify a good
independent director candidate for an audit committee? Should
the criteria differ between biotech and manufacturing company
boards? How closely does the Act's definition of audit committee
member independence 16 track factors found to be associated with
an effective audit committee? Is past experience challenging a
CEO more important than financial and relationship
independence? Would substantial long-term stock ownership be
more important than other factors in identifying effective
independent directors? These are just some examples of issues
where additional research and knowledge could benefit
shareholders.
It may also be that development of a better shareholder
information base could be served by the participation of
sociologists or behavioral psychologists, along with business,
economic, and legal researchers, in a robust interdisciplinary
approach to corporate governance research. An interdisciplinary
perspective might be especially appropriate for issues like:
Identifying the different impacts that investors with short-
term, versus long-term, horizons have on a company's success
in creating and maintaining value;
Analyzing the differences in employee retention associated with
use of stock options versus restricted stock;
Whether the length of time that a director's equity ownership
interests in the company are locked up impacts how the
director's decisions align with shareholder interests as opposed
to management interests;
Whether the length of the term to which a director is elected
performance measure that seems to be related to executives' equity holdings is
earnings per share, and that can be controlled by management through things like
stock buy back programs and cutting dividends.
16 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m))
("In order to be considered to be independent... a member of an audit committee of
an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit
committee ... (i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from
the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.").
2002]
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affects the director's responsiveness to shareholder interests;
Examining the impact of diversity of age, sex, race, income, and
other factors on effectiveness of boards in particular industries;
Identifying approaches that tend to make a new or dissident
director most effective;
Determining when shared CEO/chairmanship posts are likely
to present increased risks of corporate governance failure;
Finding how the level of CEO compensation affects decisions
and actions of a CEO;
Evaluating whether directors are likely to be more effective if
they have regular interaction with shareholders;
How public disclosure of director votes on particular issues
would impact the board's procedures and decisions; and
Whether the presence of a competing candidate for a director's
slot has any impact upon how that director performs after being
elected.
Refocusing institutional investor resources on research may
require greater interaction between academics and shareholder
organizations. Such cooperation could be beneficial to
identifying issues that merit shareholder focus and in informing
institutional investors of research findings.
B. Cultivation of Director Professionalism
Many board problems associated with ignorance or
incompetence might be resolved through additional training and
creation of more definitive expectations for directors-in other
words, creating a more professional director role.
This concept of director professionalism should not be
confused with "professional directors." Development of director
professionalism is intended as an effort to equip each director
with the tools to be as effective a shareholder representative as
possible. It is not an attempt to create a separate class of
individuals who view directorship as their sole occupation.
I am amazed that this issue has not received much attention
until recently. Rarely do we interact with professionals of any
type who were not trained to enter their profession and do not
participate in continuing education, designed to keep their skills
current. We may have devoted more of society's effort to
ensuring the competency of barbers and manicurists than to
[Vol.76:787
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evaluating and maintaining the skill set of individuals being
selected to oversee multibillion dollar corporations that control
the fortunes and livelihoods of millions of people.
An infrastructure to train and maintain the skills of
corporate directors, however, has been slowly building over the
last decade. There are an increasing number of director
education programs. For example, the National Association of
Corporate Directors, Stanford Law School, State of Wisconsin
Investment Board and University of Wisconsin, Harvard,
University of Chicago, Wharton, TIAA-CREF Institute,
Kennesaw State University, University of Delaware Corporate
Governance Center, and other groups now sponsor director
training programs. 17 However, the cultural expectation, and the
legal requirement, that directors avail themselves of these
opportunities has been lacking.
That may well be changing. The proxy voting advisor,
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), recently unveiled a
program to accredit boardroom education programs for the
purpose of awarding additional credit, when determining the
corporate governance quotient rating of that company's board, to
directors who attend them.'8  ISS takes the quotients into
consideration when evaluating proxy issues for its voting
recommendations to institutional investor clients. In addition,
new listing standards proposed by Nasdaq and the NYSE
contain continuing director education components. 19  These
developments should encourage board members to develop their
skills and foster a greater sense of professionalism.
17 See Jonathan D. Epstein, Traveling Training Programs Is Proposed in Wake
of Major Corporate Scandals, NEWS J., Sept. 22, 2002, § E (Business), available at
2002 WL 22881692 (discussing various diretor training programs and their recent
popularity); see also Paul D. Lapides, A Robust Market for Director Education, DIRS.
& BOARDS, Sept. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL 19160328.
18 ISS provides corporate governance quotient (CGQ) ratings for all companies
in the Russell 3000 Index. CGQs are developed with use of a database covering
seven core governance categories: board structure and composition, charter and
bylaw provisions, applicable state laws, executive compensation, financial
performance, director and officer stock ownership, and director education. CGQs
allow shareholders to assess a company's relative corporate governance profile
compared to other index and industry peer group companies.
19 See Corporate Governance Rule Proposals, supra note 3. In addition, Nasdaq
has proposed listing standards that would require continuing director education.
See Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., Nasdaq Takes New Actions on
Corporate Governance (July 25, 2002), available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com/news/pr2002/nesection02_141.html.
2002]
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Institutional investors could also improve the effectiveness
of director training by participating in boardroom education
programs themselves. This is one way to provide a quality
control check on such programs and to increase the dialogue and
understanding between directors and shareholders. For
example, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, CalPERS,
the TIAA-CREF Institute, and others co-sponsor and participate
in the Directors' Summit,TM which is held annually at the Fluno
Center for Executive Education, University of Wisconsin in
Madison.20 These conferences have been cited as instrumental
for building stronger boards and stronger companies. 21
C. Replacing Ineffective Directors
The most challenging task for shareholders in the twenty-
first century is likely to be one that they rarely attempted in the
days before Enron-changing membership of the board. In order
to provide effective checks and balances on management's
control in the American system of corporate governance,
however, shareholders have little choice. The corporate
structure is premised on the supposition that directors represent
and owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. 22 Enron clearly
illustrated that when directors are unwilling or incapable of
playing an active fiduciary role, shareholders face an increased
level of risk.23 For institutional investors with large portfolios
that are broadly diversified or indexed, the only way to deal with
this increased risk is to replace the directors with board
members who will be more effective.
Current roadblocks to replacing ineffective directors are
cultural, as well as legal, financial, and practical. Shareholders
have historically been wary about undertaking efforts to replace
ineffective directors. Events of the last year may, however, have
created the impetus needed to overcome this reluctance. Some
initial systemic changes could also help get things started. For
instance:
20 See Michael T. Harris, Boot Camps for Boards, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, Jan. 1,
2002, available at 2002 WL 9628973.
21 See id.
22 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Loft, Inc. v.
Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1938), affd, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
23 See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70 (2002) (describing how the
Enron Board failed).
[Vol.76:787
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The SEC and Department of Labor could provide interpretive
guidance to mutual funds and pension funds confirming the
circumstances under which efforts to replace ineffective
directors constitute a proper purpose for the expenditure of
fund assets;24
Provisions of SEC Rule 14a-8(i) could be changed to open up the
company's proxy for inclusion of alternatives to management's
candidates when the dissidents have an appropriate level of
shareholder support; and
Institutional investors could develop their own stable of
qualified director candidates or establish relationships with
firms that have executive search capabilities to locate
appropriate candidates to run against ineffective directors. 25
Where shareholders are being harmed by ineffective
directors, large investors need to bite the bullet and begin to run
alternate candidates. Some institutional investors, like Franklin
Mutual Advisers and Iridian Asset Management, have already
successfully run alternate candidates. 26  More examples of
mainstream institutional investors successfully putting new
blood on boards are needed. Additional successful attempts to
run alternative candidates would help overcome current
institutional investor fears about doing something different.27 In
24 See, e.g., Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000) (requiring that an ERISA pension fimd's assets be
expended "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-(A) for
the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries"). While attempts to improve the performance of boards in which
pension fund assets are invested would seem to be a proper purpose for the
expenditure of trust funds, some fiduciaries might be reluctant to support an
alternate slate of candidates due to an abundance of caution about whether such an
expenditure would be allowable.
25 Ideally, shareholders and company nominating committees might cooperate
in retaining an executive search firm to independently identify qualified board
candidates with the desired qualifications.
26 Franklin Mutual Advisers and Iridian Asset Management proposed a
dissident slate of three directors, at ICN Pharmaceuticals, that was elected on a
three-to-one margin. See 3 Outsiders Are Elected to the Board of ICN, N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 2002, at C2. The NACD notes that contested board elections continue to
grow, with insurgent investors' nominees winning majority votes at nearly half of
the 20 contested elections that came to proxy votes at meetings in the first three-
quarters of 2001. Dissident shareholders also gained additional seats on 17 boards
during the 2001 proxy season, after threatened proxy fights were settled. See NAT'L
Ass'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., supra note 10, at 2.
27 The fiduciary standard to which most institutional investors are held
encourages trustees to stay within the range of actions taken by other institutional
investors. For example, the fiduciary standard that applies to most private pension
2002]
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addition, the more often shareholders act to replace ineffective
directors, the more likely nominating committees will cooperate
in finding better board candidates in the first place.
Other initiatives focused around elimination of ineffective
directors may also help to improve the quality of corporate
boards. If implemented, the following might help to protect or
enhance shareholder value:
Establishment of requirements that directors own and continue
to hold (without hedging or transfer of ownership risk) a
significant amount of company stock during and after their
term;
Imposition of term limits to encourage fresh ideas or get rid of
co-opted directors;
Proxy reporting on the track record (e.g., involvement in
lawsuits, awarding excessive executive compensation for poor
performance) of a director at other companies where he or she
is also on the board;
Establishment of limits on the number of other boards a
director may contemporaneously serve on to ensure sufficient
time is devoted to company matters;
Splitting the positions of CEO and chairman or providing for
the appointment of a lead independent director where the
positions are combined;
Requiring that the board conduct some sort of self-evaluation,
in addition to evaluation of the CEO and senior management,
at least annually;
Mandating a report to the shareholders on the status of
management succession planning to provide internal
candidates for top management positions when a transition is
needed;
Withholding votes for re-election of directors on compensation
committees where the CEO's compensation package is excessive
and company peer group adjusted performance has lagged over
the long term;
Requiring disclosure of individual directors' votes on important
issues, such as executive compensation, option expensing,
funds requires trustees to use the same "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that
others "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims." 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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retention of auditors, waiver of conflicts, installing poison pills,
and making merger decisions; and
Adjusting director compensation to adequately reward the
board for devoting the necessary time and effort to company
matters.
Of all the initiatives that shareholders could pursue, those
that relate directly to strengthening the board of directors
appear to be the most compelling. They are the shareholders'
most direct means of establishing a healthy counterbalance to
management's influence over the board.
CONCLUSION
After the corporate governance failures represented by
Enron and its progeny, shareholders need to rethink their
priorities. The maximum shareholder impact on preservation
and enhancement of value over the long term should result from
a focus on corporate governance research, director training, and
replacement of ineffective board members. The events of the last
year have shown the damage that can occur when shareholders
take their eyes off the board and fail to play their role as part of
the checks and balances in America's corporate governance
system.
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